Abstract

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From One Template To Another: Performing In A New Context

ABSTRACT

This paper provides a process model of business model innovation. There isn’t much work on how a business model template originates, and especially how a new one emerge to face a new context. This paper provides a process model of business model innovation. It centers on the sponsor-based business model through which firms monetize their offering via sponsors instead of setting prices to their customer base. We conduct an exploratory study of a business model innovation occurring in the GPS navigation industry. The results suggest eight distinct subprocesses that were grouped into three aggregated business model innovation processes that enable value creation and value capture across a set of stakeholders.

Keywords: Business model innovation, grounded theory, Sponsor-based business model.
INTRODUCTION

Strategy and entrepreneurship revolve around identifying and exploiting new opportunities while driving towards “organizationally consequential innovations that are adopted in the pursuit of competitive advantage” (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009: 7). Innovations, according to Schumpeter (1934), can take five major forms: 1) product; 2) process of production; 3) supply side changes; 4) new markets and 5) novel means organizational forms. Our research centers on the later form, often acknowledged as business model innovation in the recent literature. In its essence, a business model innovation “refers to the search for new logics of the firm and new ways to create and capture value for its stakeholders; it focuses primarily on finding new ways to generate revenues and value propositions for customers, suppliers, and partners” (Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013: 464). Scholars across the fields of strategic management (Amit & Zott, 2001; Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013; Nielsen & Lund, 2018), innovation studies (Afuah, 2018; Bolton & Hannon, 2016; Desyllas & Sako, 2013), organization theory (Foss & Saebi, 2015), accounting (Huelsbeck, Merchant, & Sandino, 2011; Nielsen & Roslender, 2015; Sort & Nielsen, 2018), marketing (Pauwels & Weiss, 2008; Verhoeven & Johnson, 2017) and operations management (Visnjic, Wiengarten, & Neely, 2016) all express the importance of business model innovation. Furthermore, both scholars and practitioners seem to agree that some of the fastest growing firms today appear to be those that leverage the process of business model innovation to remain competitive in a dynamic environment (Bradley, Loucks, Macaulay, Noronha, & Wade, 2015; Geissbauer, Vedso, & Schrauf, 2016; Kane, Palmer, Phillips, Kiron, & Buckley, 2015; Sorescu, 2017; Westerman, Calméjane, Bonnet, Ferraris, & McAfee, 2011; Wirtz & Daiser, 2017, 2018). However, the processes and subprocesses by which firms originate business models to exploit new business opportunities remains a black box. Specifically, more research is needed to clarify “the
mechanisms and processes of business model innovation and change” (George & Bock, 2011: 88) and “the process and elements of business model innovation as well as its enablers” (Schneider & Spieth, 2013: 134). We do not know much about this process of innovation.

While a few theoretical studies have contributed towards the understanding of the origins of business models (e.g. Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu (2013) and Martins, Rindova, & Greenbaum (2015)), they do not capture the underlying mechanisms that leads a firm from an existing model to a novel one. In this research, we examine the phenomenon of business model innovation. Specifically, we ask: how do these processes and subprocesses that constitute a business model innovation evolve to create and capture value for its stakeholders in a new context?

As there are an abundance of different business model innovations in the literature and in practice, it is necessary to limit the scope of our research. Hence, we will focus on sponsor-based business model innovations. A sponsor-based business model innovation occurs when a firm undergoes a process of change by which it monetizes its offering through sponsors, and no longer by charging prices to its customers as it used to (see Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu (2013) for an extensive explanation and overview of the importance of this class of business model innovations).

The Empirical Case

This research is an effort to describe the business model innovation process. Our empirical case is one in which an established business model is being grafted and transformed into a novel one. Because the established business model (original template) was the firm`s main revenue source, its alteration was risky. Accordingly, the process of business model innovation involves to some extent “conscious design thinking” preceding its deployment. We use this innovation effort to identify elements that characterize the business model innovation process.
In 2007, the firm NDrive was founded as a result of a spin-off from an earlier cartography company. The firm first entered the Portable Navigation Device (PND) market upon launch of a portable electronic device that combined positioning capability via GPS and interactive navigation functions sold as an off-the-shelf product in large retailers and electronic stores. The product, which represented both hardware and software, allowed the firm to establish a manufacturing business model similar to existing players, such as Garmin or TomTom, monetizing its offering directly from the sale of the device commonly known as a “GPS receiver” to their customers.

What captured our attention about this specific company was first that NDrive had been running a successful business model for several years (highly engrained within the activities and routines of the firm) by the time they decided to engage in a radical shift towards a sponsor-based business model. Second, the fact the firm was standing at the edge of a number of blossoming business opportunities brought by progresses in online mapping (i.e., Google Maps), smartphone technologies and mobile navigation (smartphone-based applications). Third, the fact the sponsor-based business model engineered from 2009 to 2011 was pioneer in the industry. Thus, there was a lot of uncertainty concerning its potential success.

Overall, this research setting seemed particularly attractive for studying the process of business model innovation as it encapsulates a dynamic and uncertain business environment characterized by numerous competitors (hardware, software, mobile and online players) and rapid technological advances that require managers to rationalize and act fast due to constant change (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). While the case covered in this research is more complex than a regular sponsor-based model innovation, due to its partnership components, we believe the insights are applicable to other less complex business model innovation efforts.
Related Literature

Our study builds upon several strands of literature. First, it builds on the literature on exploitation and exploration of resources and activities. As firms engage in the process of business model innovation, they deal with constant trade-offs between the exploitation of existing activities and the exploration of new opportunities. Exploitation can be generally described as refinement and extension of existing knowledge and competences without interfering with the basic nature of existing activities (Mom, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007; Starbuck, 1992; Van Den Bosch, Volberda, & De Boer, 1999). In contrast, exploration can largely be described as a break from the existing dominant template of how the company operates (i.e. their existing business model). Exploration deals with “the pursuit and acquisition of new knowledge” (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006: 693) and the “search for new knowledge” (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001: 459). It relates to activities linked with obtaining intelligence and searching for novel ways to do business (Lori Rosenkopf, 2001; Vassolo, Anand, & Folta, 2004), sometimes leading to shifts in technological orientation (Benner & Tushman, 2002). It represents a move away from existing routines and activities in order to allow for novel ones (i.e. a new business model). This is intrinsically connected with the ideas firms must seek intelligence beyond their domain, and reach for novel contexts (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003, 2003) requiring absorptive capabilities to motivate and direct the learning of novel knowledge (Nooteboom, Van Haverbeke, Duysters, Gilsing, & Van den Oord, 2007).

The exploration phase conveys great challenges for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as they suffer from the ‘liabilities of smallness’ due to their shortage of slack resources and possible deficiencies in their uses (Thornhill & Amit, 2003). Scholars have looked at these issues (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005; Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009) and suggest establishing
interfirm partnerships as a plausible solution. Unlike these studies that typically look from the perspective of the benefits of establishing interfirm partnerships, the object of this study is about the process of business model innovation in order to create and capture value in a new context. Specifically, the process by which a firm went from monetizing its offering by setting prices to its customers to monetize its offering through a sponsor-based business model.

Second, we touch upon the resource orchestration theory. Such highlights a firm’s action towards the use of resources to accomplish strategic aims. It comprises the processes of organizing and bundling the right resources in order to create and capture value (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Scholars have both conceptually (Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011) and empirically (Chadwick, Super, & Kwon, 2015; Wales, Patel, Parida, & Kreiser, 2013) studied these issues, but few studies (with the exception of Baert et al. (2016)) have studied resource orchestration beyond “within-firm processes”. Unlike these studies, our research brings insights on “beyond the firm processes”, where interfirm partnerships are central for the sponsor-based business model presented in this case.

Third, this study also relates to the platform literature (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013; Cennamo & Santalo, 2013; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Seamans & Zhu, 2013), where “platforms are institutions that act as intermediaries to enable transactions between multiple sides of a market” (Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013: 469). Unlike a large part of the literature that focuses on understanding the benefits of platforms and multisided markets, our research builds on to this literature by exploring their origins. Specifically, we uncover the processes that lead to the creation of a two-sided business model.

Finally, we also add to the vibrant literature examining the business model innovation phenomenon. Kuratko and Audretsch (2009) argue organizational innovations may drastically
depart from the firm’s existing ways of doing business, and can take one of five forms: 1) strategic renewal; 2) sustained regeneration; 3) domain redefinition; 4) organizational rejuvenation, and 5) business model reconstruction. Our work focuses on the later form, often acknowledged in the literature as business model innovation. Business model innovation is the process whereby the firm seeks novel ways to create and capture value for its stakeholders, by designing or re-designing its core operations and resource orchestrations, in order to monetize their offering. Studies have vastly acknowledged the importance of business model innovation, referring to it as a pathway toward competitive advantage (Teece, 2010), a quest toward an innovative means of value creation and capture (Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013; Foss & Saebi, 2017a; Sinfield, Calder, McConnell, & Colson, 2012), and an important process of adoption, change and experimentation (Gambardella & McGahan, 2010; Günzel & Holm, 2013; Kindström & Kowalkowski, 2014; Visnjic et al., 2016; Yunus, Moingeon, & Lehmann-Ortega, 2010). However, the literature still struggles to understand how business model innovation initiatives depart from an original template to progressively form a novel one (Foss & Saebi, 2017b).

**METHOD**

Due to the lack of theory on the phenomenon of business model innovation, our aim is to advance grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) via an inductive method instead of a deductive one - an interpretative case study, instead of a large scale statistical analysis. Only the existence of strong theory and associated propositions make deductive methods feasible. There are several well-known strengths and weaknesses that characterize case studies. Their strengths lay on their
capacity to detect and capture qualitative details of complex processes via interviews and other complementary data that otherwise might be disregarded (e.g. Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Their weaknesses lies on the inability to establish “grand” generalizations, in contrast with inferential statistics (Gupta, Hoopes, & Knott, 2015). While we have some expectation about how business model innovation occurs, the goal is to observe how in this occurrence it did happen. We want to understand what might account for the successful innovation of an established business model. Thus, while we engage in this study with expectations, our data gathering and methods of analysis enable us to uncover what happened and assemble concrete facts beyond those expectations.

Research setting

The setting for our research is a small and medium enterprise in the GPS navigation industry. The industry had its inception in the sixties with the introduction of satellite based navigation technology by the US military in order to support ship navigation. The technology evolved over the years and has become known as GPS – Global Positioning System. The first known portable navigation device (PNDs) for commercial use was launched in 1989 by Magellan Navigation Inc. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the GPS navigation systems had become commonplace among consumer electronics via PNDs manufactured and sold by companies such as Garmin, TomTom and NDrive. While the first commercially available mobile phone containing a GPS receiver was launched in 1999, mobile phones only became serious competitors to PNDs a decade later with the advent of smartphones and their user-friendly interfaces (Sullivan, 2012).
Sales of PNDs worldwide suffered a dramatic drop during the first quarter of 2009. TomTom revealed a shocking 29 percent drop in unit shipment, and a stock market plunge of more than 80% from its late 2007 peaks. As a result, manufacturers started turn their focus towards integrating their software within mobile devices and charge a licensing fee per user (Wortham, 2009). This business model became common place in the industry – monetization by setting prices to its customer on a yearly basis for the use of software within a mobile device. Users were required to download maps and software into their devices as live online mapping solutions were still at its infancy, and required WIFI connection or costly mobile data plans to run, making it unattractive for the general public at the time.

NDrive, through by prospecting for new business and assimilating market information, discovered early on that mobile devices would soon replace traditional PNDs. From 2009 to late 2011, the firm engaged on a quest towards engineering a new business model unseen in the GPS navigation industry – the sponsor-based business model. The process of change to a sponsor-based business model from their original manufacturing business model was complex, lengthy and involved three different partners with complementary resources. The partners involved were NDrive, Mappy\(^1\) owned by French Yellow Pages\(^2\) and TomTom\(^3\). NDrive was responsible to produce high quality navigation software that could run on IOS and Android mobile devices. Mappy, as part of the Yellow Pages, provided the marketing power and brand awareness for the app, as well as a large sales force and database of businesses in France. TomTom brought to the

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1 Mappy was a leading French local search engine for points of interest on maps online, on mobile phones or tablets. Today Mappy has over 13 million users on a monthly basis. Mappy used to be a fully owned subsidiary of the French Yellow Pages – Pages Jaunes – and a reference for navigation in France via their website, PNDs and mobile apps.

2 Pages Jaunes, the French Yellow Pages, are a telephone and address directory of businesses present both online and offline. In 2012, PagesJaunes.fr received over 1 billion visits per year.

3 TomTom is a Dutch GPS company that provides navigation and mapping products. They provide 98% of the maps for NDrive today.
partnership access to updated and reliable maps. Together, they formed what would become the first free mobile GPS application (Mappy GPS Free⁴) available on the IOS and Android platforms. The mobile application offered the same functionality as the former NDrive’s PND product, but on a mobile phone instead of a dedicated device. By simply downloading the software application available for free on IOS or Android, users could navigate the streets of Paris using their mobile device, without requiring a WIFI connection to the internet or a mobile data plan to access the maps and functionalities. The sponsor-based business model was monetized as follows. Local businesses in France were presented the possibility to advertise their address via “Carte de Visite GPS” (GPS business card) subscription on the Mappy GPS Free app, an option sold by the French Yellow Pages for a yearly fee of €96 (Privat, 2012). Revenues were then divided among partners. NDrive, from 2009 to 2012, progressively became a software-only company, dropping their former established manufacturing business model. The final outcome of the change in business model for NDrive was successful. By 2013, the sponsor-based business model represented the largest source of revenue the firm had ever had, with unprecedented margins for the industry.

**Data sources**

The main goal of this study is to understand the phenomenon of business model innovation. Hence, we focus on actions taken by NDrive in the adoption of the sponsor-based business model. We gathered data from interviews, archival documents and secondary data.

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⁴ Mappy GPS Free is a free navigation software that runs on the mobile platforms Android and IOS without requiring internet connection to function.
**Interviews.** We undertook extensive semi-structured interviews with key informants. In line with Spradley (1979), we asked “Grand Tour” open ended questions to let interviewees express whatever they considered relevant, and “follow up” questions that lead the interviewee to matters relevant to the process of business model innovation. Grand Tour questions have the advantage of capturing data that often goes well outside the scope of the author`s perceptions. Follow-up questions permit for more details regarding the sponsors-based model objectives, challenges, processes and results. All interviews were retrospective. In total, 21 interviews were undertaken between 2017 and 2018, totaling over ten hours of recorded material resulting in 317 transcribed pages. While the top management of NDrive was key in describing in detail the process of change, we also conducted in-depth interviews with several other employees at NDrive as well as with the CEO of Mappy. Employees from IT, operations, sales, accounting and finance, and even former staff responsible for the warehouses were consulted in order to get an overhaul picture of the changes at all levels. IT employees’ interviewed allowed us to get a concrete picture of the development and software challenges of the time. They described the changes taking place in their departments, what were the priorities and how the sponsor-based business model affected their product roadmap and resource allocation. Staff from the operations departments described their initial confusion with the process of change, and how the company gave them a chance to adapt to the new reality. Sales representatives were able to articulate well the shift in value proposition taking place. Accounting and finance employees allowed us to better understand the nature of the NDrive-Mappy-TomTom contractual relationship, and the impact of the new business model on the firm`s margins and profitability. Warehouse employees shared with us how the top management communicated the change from top to bottom, their initial struggle to understand the shift taking place, and the impact such had in the overall
company. Rich data from the different actors involved enabled us to triangulate on the information and build a concrete picture of the events taking place.

**Archival and secondary data.** We have archival data comprising formal files (proposals, presentations, agreements) and informal files (communications between NDrive, Mappy and TomTom) from NDrive. Furthermore, we sourced secondary data from private and public company documents, press releases, company website and major industry blog posts. All represent valuable sources of information for the research, as they were written as the company was going through the changes associated with the business model innovation process. Archival and secondary data bring two major benefits to our research. First, they serve as source of validation for the data collected via interviews. Second, they allow for the removal/verification of any recall bias identified in the interview data. Archival and secondary data are both complementary to interviews, and represent a strong hedge against biases originating from too much data from a single source, strengthening the validity and reliability of our findings.

**Synthesis.** We began with interviews to the top management of NDrive. We compared transcripts from all interviews to identify where possible discrepancies. We then followed with an interview with the CEO of Mappy. While our focus was on NDrive’s process of business model innovation, we felt it was important to hear the perspective from the firm’s main partner Mappy. We then interviewed other employees at NDrive beyond the decision makers in order to enrich our data. When certain accounts were divergent, we studied the nature of the deviation. When feasible, we compared accounts from interviews with archival and secondary data. We recurrently got back to the top management team of NDrive to clarify any questions or doubt that we had, by either
phone or email. The diversity of forms and data sources played a major role in deriving a reconstruction of how events took place, as well as cross-validate the data from the various sources.

**Analytical Approach**

The empirical analysis undertaken in this study has two components. First, we strived to reconstruct a “storyline” of the whole process of business model innovation from its inception to market launch. In line with Gupta et al. (2015) and Montealegre (2002), we gathered a “series of events in a storyline that allows the data to tell the story” (Gupta et al., 2015: 857). This approach is very powerful as it lets readers create a mental picture on the data and case at hand (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The second component of our analysis used the methodology described by Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton for novel concept development (2013). By contrasting case data and theory, a structure grounded in data progressively took shape (Gioia et al., 2013) and molded into a theoretical model grounded (Locke, 2001). In line with the methods developed by Gioia et al. (2013), three fundamental steps form the basis of this analysis.

**Step 1.** Data regarding activity development were identified via open coding (Locke, 2001). Such activities were then labelled and their development identified. Then, after numerous re-readings of the data, preliminary labels that were of similar nature were combined into preliminary steps. Every time fit was not found with a specific preliminary step, it was revisited. This iterative process facilitated the grouping of preliminary labels into “1st-order” codes. At the same time, actions resulting from the orchestration of the new business model were tracked. In particular, visual maps in line with our storyline illustrating when such changes were made (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
**Step 2.** Through axial coding, an attempt was made to merge “1st-order” codes into core “2nd-order” constructs linked to activity changes (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). A systematic contrast of case data, nascent “2nd-order” constructs and the existing literature was undertaken in order to adjust labels and assess fit (Gioia et al., 2013). In order to reduce confirmatory and other interpretation biases, an external researcher performed as a reviewer throughout the process in order to ensure the nascent “2nd-order” construct validity (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

**Step 3.** From step 1 and 2, an attempt was made to deduce how these interrelationships among constructs could be structured into a comprehensive framework (Gioia et al., 2013). For instance, some subprocesses were associated with absorbing knowledge, while others were related to the impact of such knowledge on operations. Moving back to the literature on learning, resource orchestration, business models and strategic management, observations were contrasted with existing theoretical constructs. Resemblances were sought within existing theory to ground the processes identified (Gioia et al., 2013). Building on the literature, a grounded model of how business model innovation occurs was elaborated. In order to increase reliability, the emerging model was presented to the top management of NDrive at various stages for validation and guidance purposes. Figure 1 illustrates the first-order constructs, second-order constructs, and aggregated theoretically grounded constructs.

**RESULTS**

Through a combination of storyline and conceptual development, we deduced eight subprocesses that led the firm toward the sponsor-based business model: prospecting for business; assimilating intelligence; value creation redesign; value capture redesign; governance redesign; resource acquisition; resource reconfiguration and commercialization. Due to poor fit
between existing theoretical constructs and these subprocesses, they were clustered into three aggregate processes: absorption, redesign, and orchestration. Figure 1 illustrates our methodology, and table 1 an overview of these processes and subprocesses and their definitions.

--- Please Insert Figure 1 Here ---

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**Absorption**

The process of absorption can broadly be defined as the process of searching and identifying valuable information for assimilation purposes by the firm (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Tsai, 2001). The analysis revealed that two of the subprocesses refer to the absorption process: prospecting for new business and assimilation of external intelligence. Table 2 demonstrates some illustrative examples.

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NDrive hired an executive foreign to the navigation industry, recognized for his international business development and sales expertise. This executive ultimately became the CEO shortly after. His tack was to contact large international corporations already in the business of GPS navigation instead of focusing on B2C sales of NDrive branded PNDs via retailers or electronic stores. His idea was to convince large foreign players to purchase NDrive’s white-labeled PNDs, where they offered to take care of all PND’s manufacturing, software development and updates.
**Prospecting for new business.** He visited several customers over the months to come; convinced his approach could significantly increase sales. Upon visiting a potential customer in France, he learned that they were no longer interested in commercializing PNDs.

“The very first time that I was exposed to Mappy as a brand I was trying to sell the finished product that was white labeled.”

Mappy revealed PNDs were becoming a commodity. The future of personal navigation would no longer be in PNDs, but on mobile devices where software updates and new products could be delivered and sold instantly instead of the logistic hassle associated with the sale of hardware. Mappy revealed they had strong brand recognition in France, but limited mobile software development capabilities.

"Mappy said to me: Listen. We have a phenomenal brand. We have the tremendous amount of know how in in-house, but we don't necessarily have the ability to produce an aggregation map based on our core assets.”

The CEO presented the Mappy idea to the board of NDrive, who reviewed it and decided to explore the possibility of a digital solution instead of the traditional hardware sales that had characterized the growth and success of the firm since its inception. In fact, the board knew PND sales worldwide were in sharp decline, that strong competition was driving prices down and that their margins were being squeezed. Conversations evolved between the two companies and NDrive agreed to consult on a mobile solution for Mappy.

**Assimilating intelligence.** The process of assimilation refers to understanding, deducing implications, and forming of relations between market (external) and business (internal) intelligence (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). At the time, NDrive had a limited understanding of
mobile software development and employed no IOS or Android programmers. The company began by assimilating market intelligence from seminars, conferences and workshops outside of their industry to better understand the mobile platforms.

“Suddenly you could upload software to an app store and have your product delivered to millions of customers, without logistics, or customs, or pallets, or manufacturing, or stocks, etc.”

Simultaneously, NDrive used the assimilation subprocess to understand how mobile platforms could potentially change the industry by networking with key influencers in the navigation industry.

“Every year we attend the CES (Consumer Electronic Fair) in Las Vegas. AT CES we were able to visit our clients, and also observe what our competition is offering new this year.”

Opinions in the industry were divided. Some were of the opinion PNDs will always be superior to phone based solutions. Their arguments were that a dedicated device will always be superior to a GPS available on a “Swiss knife” device. Some argued mobile based GPS was the future of navigation for civilian use, but not commercial. Looking back, a new era was about to begin. Broadband cellular network technology (3G and then 4G mobile internet), smartphones and the launch Apple App store opened a new array of possibilities.

“It was a time (2009) where you start really having powerful smartphones, and an app store as a borderless delivery mechanism to millions of users worldwide. This allowed putting software in people’s pockets via their smartphones.”

At the same time, a popular book among the Silicon Valley crowd entitled “Free: The Future of a Radical Price by Chris Anderson (2009) was released. Concepts from the book were highly debated online, at conferences, and in company boardrooms. Anderson offered a
A compelling case that, in many instances, businesses can increase profits by giving away their products for free instead of charging for them. He argued that traditional economics of scarcity do not apply to digital businesses, making a compelling case for offering products to users for free while finding other means for capturing value for the firm. For example, Google offers a large part of its products for free to users. Their revenue models gravitate towards charging advertisers (i.e. the sponsors) as a result of the free searches made by users – the sponsor-based business model.

“The idea of giving our product away for free and making more money this way than by selling it was a disturbing idea at the time. It was highly influential in a lot of industries, as it became for the navigation industry. “

**Redesign**

The literature agrees that interactions with customers (as well as users who may not be customers) can be a vital precursor of innovation (Foss, Laursen, & Pedersen, 2011; Morrison, Roberts, & Von Hippel, 2000; Von Hippel, 1976). As such, firms aiming to innovate their business in light of customer insights and assimilated intelligence, “must design an internal organization appropriate to support it” (Foss et al., 2011: 980). An organizational design able to leverage newly identified business opportunities (Foss, Lyngsie, & Zahra, 2013), both internally as well as with the environment in which the firms operates (Zott & Amit, 2007).

In line with the literature on organizational design, NDrive found the idea of “free” fascinating, but was not sure as to what organizational design needed to be put in place in order to make the sponsor-based business model work. This cognitive process of organizational redesign (from the original template) was structured in three major subprocesses: value creation
redesign, value capture redesign, and governance redesign. It answered the question: “Which activities need to be performed in order for value to be both created and captured by innovation?” (Zott & Amit, 2008, 2010). Table 3 demonstrates some illustrative examples.

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**Value Creation Redesign.** NDrive started to conceptualize how the sponsor-based business model that was being applied in other industries could make sense in their own. “We understood that the real value was not in licensing the brand or selling hardware and software products; the real value was in bringing to the market a stand-alone product to the IOS and Android stores for free.”

The novel business model - the sponsor-based business model - would allow end users to navigate the streets of France for free by simply downloading the app on the IOS or Android platform. However, a critical element of the model was missing: access to maps.

“But there was one thing we were missing to make the model work: a map company willing to join this partnership. Only this way would we have all ingredients necessary to make the model work.”

At the time, two major players dominated the map licensing business: TomTom and Navteq. The value created for end users was clear: a GPS navigation application offered for free on IOS and Android mobile platforms. The value capture, on the other hand, was less certain. The sponsor-based business model was unseen in the industry, and had yet to be proven profitable.
Value Capture redesign. After having conceptualized all ingredients listed (Sabatier, Mangematin, & Rousselle, 2010), they needed to define how value would be captured from the novel business model.

“Move towards a revenue sharing environment as opposed to having it per license fee.”

NDrive ultimately conceptualized a revenue model where the monetization would come from advertisement sold by Mappy through the French Yellow Pages. It would be operationalized via a favored listing ranking system, similar to what we encounter today in Google Adword, integrated within the search engine of the free app.

“We had the technology, the software, and the ability to build the product; Mappy had the brand awareness, the delivery mechanism, the servicing staff, and the sales staff for paid advertisements as they were partially owned by the yellow pages.”

Local French businesses would have the possibility to advertise their services and location in the free GPS navigation app (a product later launched and called Carte de Visite GPS” for a subscription of €96 per year). This product would be sold by the French Yellow Pages to local businesses via their sales force of over 2000 sales representatives (Privat, 2012). The revenues would then be divided among the partners.

“We monetized the search. We integrated the backend of the yellow pages company into our navigation app. It allowed businesses to advertise specifically in the Mappy GPS medium for a fee. This was because businesses wanted their address and their company to be present on a new navigation app. So there is a share of the revenue stream that went from the advertiser to the yellow pages, which then was divided among partners.”

Upon hearing of the concept, Mappy’s senior management was initially reticent, but ultimately agreed as long as NDrive would be able to convince a mapping company to join the
partnership so no cost would be incurred in purchasing a license per each app download made. The Mappy CEO revealed the risk was not on their side, but on NDrive.

“We basically had little to no risk. They (NDrive) would have all the work of producing the software. They had to convince TomTom to join the deal and give us free maps. The risk was on their side mostly at least at the beginning of the project”.

By now the value capture was clear, and NDrive had a concrete model to present to the major mapping companies.

“Our job was to convince one of the two main players that owned the maps that with our model they could make more money by giving it [maps] away for free than by selling a per-license fee.”

**Governance design.** Upon conceptualizing both value creation and capture, they were able to convince TomTom to join the partnership.

“I recall once we were about to sign a deal with TomTom, I read them about half a page of this book (Free by Chris Anderson). I told them that the world was changing, and they had the opportunity to change with the world, and that a per-purchase model license would soon be a thing of the past.”

Upon closing the partnership agreement, a complete activity system governance redesign was conceptualized to define roles, responsibilities, and rewards for each partner involved in the novel sponsor-based business model.

“They (TomTom) would move to a revenue-sharing model instead of the original licensing business.”
NDrive would be responsible only for the delivery of the mobile navigation software. Mappy assured the marketing power to advertise the mobile application. The French Yellow Pages took care of the monetization of the model. TomTom brought to the partnership access to updated and reliable maps. Together, they formed what would become the first free mobile GPS application (Mappy GPS Free) available in the IOS and Android platforms.

“We were responsible for the software and technology integration, TomTom supplied the maps, Mappy offered brand awareness in France. Its parent company, the French Yellow Pages, brought advertising money.”

Orchestration

Orchestration refers to the action of structuring and leveraging of resources and capabilities of stakeholders involved in order to create and capture value (Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007; Sirmon et al., 2007). For NDrive, the orchestration of the newly designed business model comprised three major subprocesses: acquisition, reconfiguration and commercialization. Table 4 demonstrates some illustrative examples.

-------- Please Insert Table 4 Here --------

**Acquisition.** The process of orchestration began with NDrive acquiring new resources and competences that were relevant for the operationalization of the sponsor-based business model. Acquisition is the process of obtaining resources from strategic factor markets (Barney, 1986). Specifically, this study revealed two types of actions through which acquisition took
place. First, the recruitment of Android and IOS software programmers and the recruitment of international staff to service products sold worldwide,

“We needed two main resources to make this business model work. One of them was recruiting pure mobile development talent, IOS and Andoid. The second, at the time a big investment we did in the company, was recruiting people with different backgrounds and nationalities in order to address customers in different languages coming from the app store.”

Second, the firm needed new skill sets and capabilities for existing employees.

“We had to tell some people that since we do not have logistics and warehouses anymore, they had to learn new skills valuable to the company.”

It also involved enriching internal resources, making sure they were apt to face the new context.

“We did not let go of anybody on the software part. We have very specialized people working for us. We gave them the challenge to learn a new programing language. They quickly learned what is necessary to build a navigation app on Android and IOS.”

**Reconfiguration.** The reconfiguration subprocess comprised divesting and refining existing activities and routines, shaping new ones, and changing their original relationships and/or governance. The reconfiguration process began with the CEO and product manager scrutinizing NDrive’s baseline activities and priorities.

“We moved from a warehouse setting—where we would sell PNDs all across the world, where they would reach a retail store, and then users would buy it—to an environment where suddenly at midnight, you upload an app and by 5:00 A.M. you have 25,000 people who
downloaded it. This is a radical transformation in the way that the value, the logistics, the flow, invoicing... everything works. Those changes are quite radical.”

A strong shift in employees’ perception of the change taking place was marked by the decision of the firm to divest from its logistic infrastructures, warehouses and staff.

“With great pity and with great sorrow, we had to let go of the people in the hardware side. We also let go of all warehouse people.”

Furthermore, as activities and routines were carried out by particular actors, reconfiguration often required behavioral changes within the impacted units in terms of changing roles, responsibilities, and relationships (Santos, Spector, & Van der Heyden, 2009).

“People did not understand. Our office was huge with a constant flow of devises going out. People were wondering why are we doing this when things are going so well?”

Thus, the reconfiguration subprocess allowed the firm to act on the newly designed business model, which can be, to some extent, incompatible with the prior one and requires re-assignment of management priorities.

“It was very difficult to move from things that you can touch, to things that you cannot touch. People have a different sense of value if they can touch the product”

Reconfiguration also required the reinterpretation or reorganization of existing assets in a different manner (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001; Zahra & George, 2002; Gassmann, Frankenberger, & Csik, 2015).

“We shifted from hardware focused to software focused, meaning some people should be converted in the new world.”

It involved re-allocating resources and priorities, and the creation of new internal departments dedicated to this aim:
“Mappy GPS was clearly a priority for the company by now. We had specific people allocated to it. We allowed Mappy to somehow influence our product roadmap with their own requests.”

**Commercialization.** The mobile software application “Mappy GPS Free” was launched on December 13, 2011. The marketing efforts associated with the launch of “Mappy GPS Free” were clearly on the shoulders of their partner Mappy.

“Mappy really carried that load, and this was actually the key value (of Mappy) in the partnership. Our core value was delivering the product to customers. Their core value was essentially bringing it to market. We did a spectacular job in a way that the navigation app would reach the customer in the appstore, but the delivering to customers via brand awareness was really on the Mappy side.”

Revenue generation was also the responsibility of Mappy and their parent company the French Yellow Pages. They instructed their sales people to propose the innovative advertising product “Carte de Visite GPS” (GPS business card) to their customer as an add-on product.

“Now, at the time this was incredibly sexy because we are in the early days of the App Store and smartphones... it was almost like magic that you turn on the app, you click on this business, this business is there, and the guy is super happy because his business is there.”

The value proposition offered through “Carte de Visite GPS” was considerable. Instead of having advertisers pay for an expensive front page ad on their printed directory or purchasing a banner ad on their website, they offered the possibility to reach users based on their live location and specific interests.
“If you were looking for an Italian restaurant, you would probably be prompted to go to an Italian restaurant that was 600 meters or one mile away from where you are as opposed to going to an Italian restaurant that is three hundred kilometers from where you are.”

Sales continued to grow as the French Yellow Pages sold “Carte de Visite GPS” as a key innovative product in their portfolio.

“What we were monetizing was search... when I am searching for an address or for a location in the app, I am revealing intent. If it’s 8PM and I’m searching for Italian restaurant near me, I want to go for dinner.”

Revenues were then split equally among partners. From its launch until mid-2012, Mappy GPS Free was ranked #1 in iTunes top free apps (Navigation Category), recorded over 1 million downloads totaling an average of four million visits per months and over 7000 end user reviews.

The theoretical model presented in Figure 2 recapitulates our results. Our case reveals that business model innovation processes can help uncover new forms of value creation and value capture.

--------- Please Insert Figure 2 Here ---------

**DISCUSSION**

This study extends previous research on business model innovation, attempting to clarify “the mechanisms and processes of business model innovation and change” (George & Bock, 2011: 88) and “the process and elements of business model innovation” (Schneider & Spieth, 2013: 134) through an inductive research design. Our aim was to examine the processes and subprocesses of business model innovation used by a firm to exploit new business opportunities in a new context. We identified eight specific business model innovation subprocesses —
prospecting; assimilation; value creation; value capture; governance; acquisition; reconfiguration and commercialization that enabled the firm to adapt its business model template to a new context. These were then merged into three major theoretical constructs: absorption, redesign and orchestration.

This study supplements theory in several ways. First, our research reveals that the process of business model innovation is intrinsically linked to both exploration and the exploitation. The subprocesses within absorption facilitated both exploration and exploitation. Prospecting for new business led the firm to exploit the possibility of selling a software-only solution instead of the original PND product. It also allowed them to explore alternatives business models, sparked by the assimilation of external intelligence from the “pure” software industry. The subprocesses within redesign are predominantly linked to the exploration of opportunities. The process of redesign involved rethinking the value creation and capture as well as the governance mechanisms that connect all activities together. In contrast, the subprocesses of reconfiguration is related to the exploitation of resources and activities, whereas acquisition and commercialization with exploitation and exploration.

Second, this research responds to the call made by Sirmon et al. (2011) for more empirical studies on resource orchestration. We contribute to theory by exploring how resource orchestration theory fits within the business model context. Moreover, we describe in this case how resource orchestration theory can be applied in a partnership context where synergies led to the launch of a pioneering business model in the GPS Navigation industry.

Third, we contribute to the platforms and multisided markets literature. Most of the literature on the topic reflects an economy where one sides attract the other. For example, UBER as a car sharing platforms connect two sides: drivers and people seeking a ride. The more cars
available on the UBER platform, the more attractive that platform is to users as availability of cars increase convenience. Similarly, the more users active on a particular car sharing platform, the more attractive it is for drivers to join such. However, with sponsor-based platforms, users generally favor no intrusion by sponsors when using the product (i.e., no advertisement or banners on the mobile screen). The sponsor-based business model presented in this paper reveals a means for value creation and capture without annoying the user, by instead providing valuable recommendations as a respond to searches. By understanding the origins of this novel model (absorption subprocess), this study exposes how platforms and multisided markets can be born, and how they can grow when designed and orchestrated within the right business model. Furthermore, it describes how platforms and multisided markets companies can leverage complementary resources from partnership agreements in order to create and capture value without having to charge end users for the product.

Fourth, we answer the call by Foss and Saebi (2017b) for more empirical studies on the process of business model innovation. Our results reveal that three major theoretical constructs, composed by eight different subprocesses, characterize the process of business model innovation. This study emphasize the roles and relevance of the different process components of business model innovation, setting the stage for future empirical and theoretical research on these, as well as their influence on the firm’s strategic direction, product development, and performance.

**Limitations**

This study presents limitations that open several avenues for future research. First, given its nature as a revelatory case, the generalizability of conclusions may be limited in other settings. An effort was made to produce “local” knowledge (Steyaert, 1997) offering “fine-
grained, contextualized, and processual accounts” (Baert et al., 2016: 347). The ensuing model was built through numerous conceptualizing steps, characterized by a constant “back-and-forth motion” from data to theory in order to obtain a better understanding of the phenomenon under study (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The purpose of this research was to build a preliminary map of the business model innovation process, and lay the foundations necessary in order to stimulate fruitful avenues for further theoretical and empirical research agenda on the topic of business model innovation.

Second, by pursuing the understanding of the process of business model innovation, this study dwells little on performance. More empirical research is necessary in order to define and measure the performance of business model innovation in dynamic environments.

Third, while our study is particularly useful for managers of SMEs or entrepreneurs in start-ups seeking to create and capture value via an innovative business model, large organizations approach innovation differently. As agency theory reveals, managers in large organizations place their personal best interest first. Thus, future research might find fertile ground on our inductive research to further explore how business model innovation activities might differ in large organizations.

CONCLUSION

Business model innovation is not the domain of legend, but instead is a reality. Both practitioners and scholars have much to gain by better understanding this particular process of innovation. Herein, our goal was to offer a first step towards what could become a theory of business model innovation. Standing on the shoulders of past business model researchers, we call for more scholars to shed light on the phenomenon of business model innovation. Important future research questions might include: How do large corporations engaged in business model
innovation and what are the antecedents of such engagement? Can business model innovation be considered a dynamic capability, allowing for continuous innovation of a firm’s business model over time? Or does industry pioneering business model innovation require always radical innovations or technologies to succeed? More broadly, the literature needs a prescriptive theory of business model innovation. We offer insights for such a theory. Because these insights rely upon established concepts in the management literature, we hope the field can make rapid progress in specifying its own business model innovation theory.

REFERENCES


Schumpeter, J. 1934. The theory of economic development Harvard University Press. *Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.*


FIGURE 1.

Data structure
FIGURE 2.

A theoretical model of business model innovation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGINAL TEMPLATE OF THE FIRM</th>
<th>BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION PROCESS</th>
<th>NOVEL TEMPLATE OF THE FIRM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MANUFACTURING BUSINESS MODEL where the firm sets prices to its customer base</td>
<td>ABSORPTION</td>
<td>SPONSOR-BASED BUSINESS MODEL where the firm offers its product for free to users while charging sponsors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospecting for new business</td>
<td>Assimilation of Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDESIGN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value creation</td>
<td>Value capture</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORCHESTRATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>Reconfiguration</td>
<td>Commercialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business model innovation Process</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSORPTION</td>
<td>Absorption refers to the process of searching and identifying valuable information for assimilation purposes by the firm.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospecting</td>
<td>Prospecting for new business refers to the process of hunting for business opportunities deemed relevant by management.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>Assimilation implies comprehending, interpreting, and establishing connections between gathered market (external) and business (internal) intelligence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDESIGN</td>
<td>Refers to a cognitive process of re-architecture of the firm’s existing activities system (or business model) and the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Creation</td>
<td>Refers to the cognitive process of identifying and designing the customer value proposition.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Capture</td>
<td>Refers to the cognitive process of identifying and designing mechanisms aimed at realizing economic benefit from the value created.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Refers to the cognitive process of defining whom should perform certain activities, and their respective roles and responsibilities in the processes of value creation and value capture.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORCHESTRATION</td>
<td>Refers to the actions associated with the implementation of the newly conceptualized (redesigned) business model.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>Refers to the action of obtaining the resources from strategic factor markets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconfiguration</td>
<td>Refers to the action of refining of existing activities and routines; crafting new ones and changing their original relationships.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercialization</td>
<td>Refers to the act of commercializing the new business model where value is effectively created for users and captured by the firm.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2.

Absorption (Second-order codes, first-order codes and selected representative quotes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROSPECTING</th>
<th>Contacting new B2B customers</th>
<th>“The very first time that I was exposed to Mappy as a brand I was trying to sell the finished product that was white labeled.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“He was hired because of his experience dealing with large B2B clients”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Listening to customers’ needs</td>
<td>“When I visited one of my new potential clients in France, Mappy, in order to sell them our PNDs solution as a white label product, they responded that at the time they were considering doing it by themselves. Given the technological changes and the emergence of smartphones and the app store, they were considering delivering their navigation product via an app only and dropping the hardware part. Clearly the industry was about to change.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“We listened carefully to any customer willing to pay. This is how we entered the partnership with the Yellow Pages and Mappy. We listened carefully to their struggles, and proposed a solution. We knew the Yellow Pages were under pressure from Google, and strategically proposed a solution to leverage their large database of business addresses and large marketing power.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIMILATION</td>
<td>Attending conferences &amp; workshops</td>
<td>“The idea of 3G phones and their potential came from attending Sony Ericson and Motorola Conferences in early 2000. I kept thinking about it, until I decided to launch a company to address this emerging technology.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Conferences helped us understand new trends in various industries, and allowed us to understand where technological changes were heading.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Studying mobile technology</td>
<td>“When the IPhone came out it was like an epiphany for me. I flew and bought it in the US, but couldn’t use it for 6 months in Portugal. I saw the iPhone as a natural step. The future of mobility will be devices like this.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Me and a colleague once flew to London and found a QTek 1010 – what can be considered one of the first smartphones ever invented. I remember bringing it back home and hacking its system to understand how external software could run within it.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Studying the mobile industry business trends</td>
<td>“Looking back today, if we didn’t notice this new market trend early and kept doing what we were doing, we wouldn’t be here telling the story.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“The free model for the user was growing in all software industries. Customers expected the internet and derived software to be free of charge.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.

Redesign (Second-order codes, first-order codes and selected representative quotes)

| **VALUE CREATION** | **Setting the value proposition** | “We understood that the real value was not in licensing the brand or selling hardware and software products; the real value was in bringing to the market a stand-alone product to the IOS and Android stores for free.”
| | | “If you look at the business model itself, nobody did it before. You knew this would be disruptive for other companies and other apps, you know Garmin and all those would basically lose customers because they were paid and you’re just not.”
| | **Identifying the ingredients necessary** | “At the time, there were 2 major map providers: TomTom and MapQuest. We knew we needed one of them to cooperate with use in this new model”
| | | “We had the technology, the software, and the ability to build the product; Mappy had the brand awareness, the delivery mechanism, the servicing staff, and the sales staff for paid advertisements as they were partially owned by the yellow pages.”

| **VALUE CAPTURE** | **Engineering the revenue model** | “We monetized the search. We integrated the backend of the yellow pages company into our navigation app. It allowed businesses to advertise specifically in the Mappy GPS medium for a fee. This was because businesses wanted their address and their company to be present on a new navigation app. So there is a share of the revenue stream that went from the advertiser to the yellow pages, which then was divided among partners.”
| | | “What we were monetizing was search… when I am searching for an address or for a location in the app, I am revealing intent. If it’s 8PM and I’m searching for Italian restaurant near me, I want to go for dinner.”
| | **Defining revenue distribution** | “It felt intuitively fair for me (revenue split of the yearly fee) that this would be a 50/50 percent deal. Mappy had its core assets. We had our core assets. We do something together. Let’s do 50/50.”
| | | “From my (NDrive) 50%, I would negotiate with TomTom. What we have agreed was that, going back to my fairness principle, it was 50 percent for us 50 percent for TomTom”

| **GOVERNANCE** | **Defining roles & responsibilities** | “We were responsible for the software and technology integration, TomTom supplied the maps, Mappy offered brand awareness in France. Its parent company, the French Yellow Pages, brought advertising money.”
| | | “The yellow pages were responsible for the sale of the Mappy GPS package for a yearly fee to their hundreds of thousands of existing businesses in France.”
**Table 4.**
Orchestration (Second-order codes, first-order codes and selected representative quotes)

| ACQUISITION | Obtaining new resources | “In a software company, essentially, the main investment is people. “
| | | “We needed two main resources to make this business model work. One of them was recruiting pure mobile development talent, IOS and Android. The second, at the time a big investment we did in the company, was recruiting people with different backgrounds and nationalities in order to address customers in different languages coming from the app store.”
| | Enriching internal resources | “We did not let go of anybody on the software part. We have very specialized people working for us. We gave them the challenge to learn a new programing language. They quickly learned what is necessary to build a navigation app on Android and IOS.”
| | | “We had to tell some people that since we do not have logistics and warehouses anymore, they had to learn new skills valuable to the company.”
| RECONFIGURATION | Divesting | “We moved from a warehouse setting—where we would sell PNDs all across the world, where they would reach a retail store, and then users would buy it—to an environment where suddenly at midnight, you upload an app and by 5:00 a.m. you have 25,000 people who downloaded it. This is a radical transformation in the way that the value, the logistics, the flow, invoicing... everything works. Those changes are quite radical.”
| | Re-organizing internal resources and activities | “With great pity and with great sorrow, we had to let go of the people in the hardware side. We also let go of all warehouse people.”
| | Re-assigning management priorities | “It was very difficult to move from things that you can touch, to things that you cannot touch. People have a different sense of value if they can touch the product.”
| | | “People did not understand. Our office was huge with a constant flow of devises going out. People were wondering why are we doing this when things are going so well?”
| COMMERCIALIZATION | Launch | “Whenever you are developing something you always have conflicting priorities. Now, I can tell you that back then the simple fact that something was a Mappy requests would take an enormous priority inside of the company. It was enough to say this is for Mappy for it to be immediately or essentially immediately addressed because we understood that that was a fundamental revenue stream priority.”
| | | “Mappy GPS was clearly a priority for the company by now. We had specific people allocated to it. We allowed Mappy to somehow influence our product roadmap with their own requests.”
| | Marketing & Sales | “We did a spectacular job in a way that the navigation app would reach the customer in the appstore, but the delivering to customers via brand awareness was really on the Mappy side.”
| | | “Now, at the time this was incredibly sexy because we are in the early days of the App Store and smartphones... it was almost like magic that you turn on the app, you click on this business, this business is there, and the guy is super happy because his business is there.”
| | | “Mappy really carried that load, and this was actually the key value (of Mappy) in the partnership. Our core value was delivering the product to customers. Their core value was essentially bringing it to market.”
| | | “All of a sudden, NDrive had 2,000 sales people in France.”

40